

1. Welcome to the file

- EU: EES, VIS, EURODAC, SIS
- EU: Databases around the world
- Where it all started: AZR
- The deportation machine: MARIS
- Citizens, too: Police
- The back story
- Doing something about it

2. Newsflash: EES

There's a new anti-foreigner database in town!

2023-03-16: The Bundestag approves the EES-DG. No discussion, all in favour except Die Linke.

EES? If you've not heard of it so far, don't feel bad about it. Although it's been pursued by the EU Autorilla since 2008, there's just been two articles on it in the taz (to name an example) in all those years.

3. The Entry-Exit-System

Starting 2023, all non-Schengen citizens not needing a visum who cross a Schengen border are entered into a database:

- identification, documents
- a biometric photo of the face
- 4 (!) fingerprints
- date and place of border crossing
- flags, e.g.: "overstayer?"

This data set is kept for 3-5 years *after the last border crossing*. Police can match it against photos and fingerprints they find at "crime scenes".

With the EES, the EU will have matchable fingerprints available for criminal prosecution from all its non-citizens. That's because they already have them for folks needing a visum and refugees (who would need a visum but can't get one): Enter VIS and EURODAC.

4. EURODAC

There's a great tradition in the EU for turning biometrics against refugees: EURODAC (since 2003 – this makes it the first biometric database the EU had, and one of the first worldwide).

It contains fingerprints for everyone applying for asylum within the EU, stored for 10 years. Oh, people caught without papers inside Schengen entered into EURODAC. It was installed to support Dublin II – push people where their fingerprints were first taken –, and thus the southern countries of the EU aren't all too wild about enrolling people in there.

Since 2015, the polices officially have access to EURODAC data for "exceptional cases".

5. Exceptional Cases?

I am pretty sure they run almost all suspicious fingerprints against EURODAC (and EES and VIS). Why?

- Exhibit a: Franco A., the Bundeswehr of-course-not-fascist who pretended to be a Syrian refugee. They got him in EURODAC when he tried to retrieve a Nazi gun from a toilet at Vienna's airport.
- Exhibit b: FIU's VIS searches. In the German BfDI's report for 2022, he says he has objected to the use of the Zoll's "Financial Intelligence Unit" that ran queries against VIS although the suspects didn't even need visa. With a moment's reflection it would have been clear that a VIS search wouldn't go anywhere. But nobody reflected because presumably they just run all foreigners against VIS.

Where there's a trough, there will be hogs. In other words: the only good and safe data is data that is not obtained in the first place – and making sure personal data is not obtained and processed needs to be our primary goal in data privacy struggles. See *et dona ferentes*¹ for the long version.

6. More EU Systems

SIS – Art. 24 (ex. Art. 96): 700 000 alerts for refusal of entry or stay – whenever anyone checks your papers, they're certainly going to be run against SIS. The updated SIS II now has fingerprints, full texts, and links.

VIS – Fingerprints on everyone who had a Schengen Visum within the last five years – ~ 50 Million of them. Of course, these are also available for criminal prosecutors and even "prevention" (sc. of terrorism and serious crime. What else?)

Europol – Essentially uncontrolled "analysis work files" on "human trafficking", "international terrorism" (e.g., "HYDRA", "CHECKPOINT"...). Too depressing to even contemplate.

The EU likes this so much they're exporting their surveillance systems.

¹ <https://www.datenschmutz.de/gc/burger.html>



Fig. 1

7. Deportation Charts

Believe it or not: The EU keeps deportation charts. Those for 2019 are in COM(2021) 55 (this document is, of course, confidential, but you'll find it at statewatch).

If you're curious, the top ten were Morocco, Afghanistan, Algeria, Pakistan, Iraq, Turkey, Tunisia, Nigeria, Iran, Guinea. That's by the number of successfully deported persons, the EU commission's metric.

The report praises governments for accepting mass deportations by charter planes (that includes Belarus). And criticises Iran only because it lacks a "clear and predictable procedure" for accepting deportees.

A machinery like this needs data. At home and abroad.

8. RCMS

The EU now builds surveillance and repression systems in the target countries: RCMS, Return Case Management System.

The one for Armenia even lets EU officials print *Armenian* travel documents.

In (e.g.) Senegal, the EU builds a whole citizen registry which includes fingerprints of everybody they can get their hands on. With online access by EU authorities. The EU wants that because they can then identify and deport people who tossed their passports. The Senegalese government wants that because if you have everybody's fingerprints, your repression machinery can run a lot more effectively.

There's a program for that: EUTF for Africa. 40 Million Euro in 2021. In case you're wondering: EUTF in full is "European Union Emergency Trust Fund for Stability and Addressing Root Causes of Irregular Migration and Displaced Persons in Africa" (no joking). Just so we can deport people, we're paying other countries' police states.

9. Neocolonial Negotiations

In case you have doubts how "negotiations" in the context of EUTF look like, here's a photo where the EU's "migration" commissioner Dimitris Avramopoulos and Senegal's foreign minister Mankeur Ndiaye:

(cf. Fig. 1)

10. Side note: Civi.Pol

As an aside: No misery is so bad there aren't people profiting from it.

In this case, it's the general contractor for the Senegalese registry, CiviPol.Conseil, owned by the French state and arms manufacturers (Thales, Airbus).

They're also organising arms shows with the scary name Milipol in such beacons of the rule of law as Doha and Singapur.

11. But!

Germany certainly does not need the EU to build nasty tech against foreigners.

Far from it.

12. AZR: History

1938 – The Nazis establish the Ausländerzentalkartei (filing cards)

1953 – Re-established in the West Germany

1967 – AZR is computerised (\approx first collection of its kind)

1983 – German Supreme Court reproves lawlessness of the AZR

1994 – AZRG establishes a legal framework for the AZR (11 articles allowing transferring data alone!)

2008 – European Court of Justice reproves treatment of EU citizens

2012 – Lame attempt to comply with that ruling

13. AZR: Who?

- Ausländerzentralregister („Central Registry of Foreigners“)
- Showcasing extra treatment of non-Germans
- Storing every non-German
 - who's been in Germany for more than 3 months
 - or sought asylum (or some other sort of Aufenthalt)
 - or had trouble at a German border (e.g., insufficient papers, drug possession)
 - or was deported from Germany
 - or failed the skull measurements as a Spätaussiedler
- Data is retained for 10 years after exit from Germany (across border or into grave)

The AZR keeps records even for EU citizens, which is a constant annoyance at least for EU courts. Even though German agencies don't worry too much about this, there's a somewhat smaller catalog for them, both in terms of reasons and in terms of data stored.

14. AZR: What?

- An Identifier
- Case group(s)
- Basic personal data (name, aliases, birthday, -place, marital status etc), data on spouses
- Data on identity documents, a photo
- Status references to pertaining decisions
- Adresses including last known address in country of origin
- “voluntarily” religion – since 90% of the records in Germany’s DNA file used to be “voluntary”, you get an idea how much consent actually is necessary here
- References to other official files (e.g., BA Arbeit, police records)
- Date of death

Some of this corresponds pretty closely to what the German Meldeamt (citizen Registry) has on its citizens (this includes a photo), but the cross-referencing to all kinds of files is frivolous, plus of course the fact that this is a single central database, which is not true (yet) of the Meldeamt.

15. AZR: Extra Nastyness

- Searches by photograph legal
- “Gruppenauskunft” – law enforcement and secret services can get bulk information: Imprecise query yields multiple matches (this is very unusual for such databases, as it goes against almost all principles of data protection)
- „Suchvermerke” – BKA and services can set a flag in a record, and they’ll be notified whenever something is stored.
- Extremely wide circulation – while BAMF operates the DB, almost any government agencies (and then some) have access, including BA für Arbeit, the red cross, atomic energy oversight authority, air control, and even agencies from other countries (case by case).

And if you think: “what’s wrong with the red cross”? Well, at least in Germany it’s a stronghold of the most reactionary circles. For an example that’s still typical for DRK higher-ups, Prince Wittgenstein, boss of the DRK in the 80ies, said on Migrants: “Es ist doch für die meisten von denen eh zu kalt hier, die kriegen doch bloß Schnupfen.” (It’s too cold for most of them here anyway. They’ll only catch a cold).

16. AZR: Numbers

Records in the AZR	
1999	11 Million
2010	20.4 Million
2015	26 Million

Estimate 2009: 10 Million persons.

After 9/11: 5 Million records transferred into dragnet search computer (“Rasterfahndung”).

2016/2021: 32/100 Million requests (“Geschäftsvorfälle”), 8500/14000 agencies, “many more than 100 000” users.

Guess: How many of those voted for the AfD?

17. Ausländervereinsregister

The BVA also has an extra registry for associations made up of Non-EU citizen with the express purpose of

- Information exchange among the security agencies
- Finding reasons for prohibiting the association (§14 (2) Vereinsgesetz)

I’ve wondered for a long time what exactly makes a Verein an Ausländerverein. I shudder to think what the answer might be.

18. Police Records

Standard police records (BaWü: Polas; BKA: KAN) apply to Non-Germans, too.

Even there: AD PMK (“Work file on politically motivated crime) in BaWü once included:

- A guy charged with domestic violence because he came from Marocco
- A pub owner violating the curfew because he came from Turkey
- A guy registering a taxi business because his parents came from Turkey
- Of course, plenty of people violating Residenzpflicht

A similar pattern emerged when Baden-Württemberg’s data protection officer checked the BKA’s central database KAN (criminal record index): Many warrants for the arrest of foreigners didn’t have a matching court order, many records didn’t come with expiry dates, in which case the BKA staff just slapped the maximum of 10 years on them.

19. Extra Police Files

- “Anti-Terror-Datei” – first “common file”! The ATD is supposed to collect and disseminate information from both police and secret service on people with links to “foreign terrorism” (that’s §129b). Includes items on “Volkszugehörigkeit” (ethnic affiliation), education, social environment.
- AFIS-A – fingerprints from applicants for asylum (and possibly other Non-Germans). Germans have an extra file called AFIS-P containing people under fairly serious suspicion.
- DABIS, InTEZ, etc – on “foreign terrorists”. These BKA-run databases all are about 10000 records
- “Gewalttäter Aumo” (violent criminals, motivated by being foreign) That’s parallel to similar files for right, left, and sports; it’s a common file of all the polices, but apparently nobody is wild about it – it’s just a few hundred records).

20. Full Circle: BAMF, BVA

The AZR is operated by Bundesverwaltungsamt for BAMF. Between them, they also have:

Visa-Einladerdatei – That’s mainly for Germans: those who invite too many foreigners. . .

Visadatei – Like VIS, just on the national level

MARIS – (“Migration, Asylum, Promoting returns, Integration, Security”): All the paperwork in Asylum proceedings in one box. There’s even a data exchange standard for it: XAusländer.

21. But why?

Whoever is in power suspects their subjects: Teachers, Bosses, Bundeskanzler. Hence, they want to know as much about what they’re doing as possible.

Human rights are an obstacle to power, and they’re being dismantled whenever the subjects are weak.

With citizens, governments hope that nationalism helps loyalty. Surprisingly, they’re frequently right.

So, while we have an impressive barrage on the human rights of German citizens, too, for non-Germans it’s a good deal worse.

Poor consolation: Much of what non-Germans are subjected to right now will come to German citizens later (it’s happening all the time, e.g., joint service-police files, biometrics in identity documents).

22. Conclusion

Governments watch their subjects. More so if it’s about non-citizens.

I’m afraid it’s on us to stem the tide, as the proponents of the “rule of law” clearly have largely given up.

More on all this <https://datenschmutz.de>